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What Can We Learn from the 2010 BP Oil Spill?: Five
Important Corporate Law and Life Lessons
Joseph Karl Grant*
I. INTRODUCTION
The spring and summer of 2010 will live in infamy. To be specific, on April
20, 2010, catastrophe struck when the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded
off of the coast of Louisiana.' Eleven rig workers were killed in the explosion,
and at least seventeen other workers were injured.2 The Deepwater Horizon was
positioned about fifty miles southeast of Venice, Louisiana, in water nearly 5,000
feet deep.3 Transocean, the Swiss-based owner of the rig, had been leasing it to
BP since September 2007.4 The earliest estimates indicated that the Deepwater
Horizon was leaking about 13,000 gallons of crude oil per hour.' Initially, the
cause of the explosion was unknown. However, early indications that were later
confirmed pointed to a malfunction of the rig's blow-out preventer. Three
inspections of the rig were performed in 2010, including one in the month
leading up to the explosion, and no cause for concern was found.
At the time, the Deepwater Horizon explosion had the potential to be "the
biggest blowout of an oil and gas well in the Gulf of Mexico in 30 years." 9 BP's
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) stated "[w]e are determined to do everything in
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1. Campbell Robertson, 11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes off Louisiana; 17 Are Hurt,
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, at A13.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also BBC News, Timeline: BP Oil Spill, Sept. 19, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
us-canada- 10656239 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
8. Robertson, supra note 1.
9. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Oil Rig Sinks, Raising Fears of a Major Spill in the Gulf,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, at A14.
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our power to contain this oil spill . .. [t]here should be no doubt of our resolve to
limit the escape of oil and protect the marine and coastal environments."0o These
were his famous last words. As it turns out, the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico was the largest oil spill in the history of the United States." It is
estimated that the Deepwater Horizon leaked 4.9 million barrels of oil before the
oil well was capped on July 15, 2010." Scientists estimate that BP captured only
a fifth of the leaking oil-around 800,000 barrels-in its clean-up operation."
Additionally, BP used potentially toxic and environmentally harmful dispersants
to control the spill, leaving a thick undersea residue.14
The BP oil spill was one of the biggest media topics during the spring and
summer of 2010. Oil leaked from the damaged well for over 100 days." The oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico was so bad that some were discussing the nuclear
option-literally using a nuclear explosion to stop the oil from leaking. 6 While
this might seem like a laughable solution now, at the time, some "armchair
engineers" were discussing it."
Long before the lapsing of the spill's first anniversary, several books relating
to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig had been purchased by
publishers, and several more proposals are still circulating today." If the book
contracts are any indication, the story of the oil spill riveted the nation. This
Article contributes to the literature and scholarship on the BP oil spill in the Gulf
of Mexico.
What can be learned from the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico? As a
student of corporate law and governance, and of life in general, my reflections on
the monumental events of the spring and summer of 2010, have conveyed five
readily discernable lessons:
* Lesson One: If you lie, or are perceived to be lying, or if you make
an inaccurate statement, people will lose trust in you.
* Lesson Two: Persons are not judged based on how they act in times
of comfort, but based on how they react in times of crisis.
* Lesson Three: The Emperor or King may be toppled.
10. Id.
11. BBC News, supra note 7.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. William J. Broad, Nuclear Option on Gulf Oil Spill? No Way, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010,
at Al.
17. Id.
18. Julie Bosman, No Shortage of Books on Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at Cl.
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* Lesson Four: Regulators and the regulated make for strange
bedfellows-society must vigilantly guard against regulatory
capture.
* Lesson Five: Your Big Brother or Big Sister can and will twist your
arm when he or she has a chance.
In order to place these lessons in context, this Article draws on quotations to
frame the discussion and to provide a framework for thinking and analysis.
Hopefully, you will take these and other lessons away from the 2010 BP oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico.
II. LESSON ONE: IF You LIE, OR ARE PERCEIVED TO BE LYING, OR IF YOU
MAKE AN INACCURATE STATEMENT, PEOPLE WILL LOSE TRUST IN YOU
Accuracy of statement is one of the first elements of truth; inaccuracy is
a near kin to falsehood.
-Tryon Edwards 9
Honesty is the best policy-when there is money in it.
-Mark Twain20
One central question dogged BP throughout the spring and summer of 2010:
just how much oil was being released from the Deepwater Horizon oil well? In
May 2010, BP estimated that 5,000 barrels of oil were leaking per day.2 By June
2010, BP's estimates had risen to nearly 19,000 per day.22 Meanwhile, scientists
working under the auspices of the U.S. Geological Survey estimated the flow rate
from the leaking oil well to be somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000 barrels per
day.23 These astonishing new estimates "only [added] to BP's woes."24 As
Michael Brune, Executive Director of the Sierra Club, noted: "We're finding out
more and more information about the extent of the damage .... Clearly we can't
trust BP's estimates of how much oil is coming out."2 5
With the wide swing in the estimates of leaking oil, BP soon lost credibility
and integrity with federal and state governments, as well as with the public, on
the issue of just how much oil was actually leaking. BP started out with low
19. Quotationsbook.com, Quotes by Tryon Edwards, http://quotationsbook.com/quote/176/#axzzlGR
b80Rn4 (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
20. Quotationsbook.com, Quotes by Mark Twain, http://quotationsbook.com/quote/19343/
#axzzlGRb8ORn4 (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
21. BBC News, Experts Double Estimate of BP Oil Spill Size, June 11, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/10290238 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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numbers and estimates. However, once faced with pressure from scientists, BP
revised its estimates upward. This immediate switch created a credibility gap
between BP, policymakers, and the general public.
Growing up, many older members of my family told me that if you lie
concerning small matters, people will not believe you when you attempt to tell
the truth on bigger matters. Basically, the lesson was that it was not a good
practice to lie or tell half-truths. Credibility, honesty, accuracy, and
trustworthiness were virtues extolled in my household. As I grow older and
navigate through life, I have learned that if you value the trust and confidence of
others, you must be accurate and precise in all statements that you make. If not,
you risk losing the trust of those around you.
Somewhere along the way, it is clear that those at BP either missed this
lesson or never learned it-because in the wake of a disaster, they failed to tell
the truth. By failing to seek credible outside estimates of the oil leaking, and
clinging to low-ball estimates of leakage and damage, BP did immeasurable
damage to its own reputation and credibility. In essence, BP shot itself in the
foot. Accuracy is an identical twin of truth, and inaccuracy is an identical twin of
falsehood and deceit. Lesson One for both corporations and animate humans is
simple: if you lie, or are perceived to be lying, or if you make an inaccurate
statement, people will lose trust in you. Unfortunately, BP violated this basic
maxim and will continue to pay a price because of it. Yes, humans and
corporations will one day learn that one profits more by telling the truth. Mark
Twain got it right, especially when we relate his sage wisdom to the modern
corporation: "Honesty is the best policy-where there is money involved."26 BP
could have learned something from Mark Twain.
III. LESSON TWO: PERSONS ARE NOT JUDGED BASED ON How THEY ACT IN
TIMES OF COMFORT, BUT BASED ON How THEY REACTIN TIMES OF CRISIS
Every little thing counts in a crisis.
21
-Jawaharlal Nehru
The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of
comfort and convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and
controversy.
-Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr."
26. Quotationsbook.com, Quotes by Mark Twain, supra note 20.
27. Quotationsbook.com, Quotes by Jawaharlal Nehru, http://quotationsbook.com/quote/9225/
#axzzlGRb80Rn4 (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
28. Quotationsbook.com, Quotes by Martin Luther King, Jr., http://quotationsbook.com/quote/1068/
#axzzlGRb80Rn4 (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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In life, we all face good times and bad times. At times, life can be
comfortable, and at other times, it can be turbulent and full of crisis. Often, the
times of crisis outweigh the times of comfort. In hindsight, individuals are
commonly judged by how they conduct themselves in the times of crisis,
challenge, and controversy, rather than in times of comfort. Undoubtedly, from a
public image and environmental disaster standpoint, BP faced one of the largest
corporate image crises known to humanity. At many turns, BP made a number of
missteps and miscues through its public representative, CEO Tony Hayward,
which tarnished BP's reputation for years or perhaps generations to come.
Ultimately, as a corporate citizen and for better or for worse, BP will be forever
judged by how it managed the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico during the spring
and summer of 2010.
It is always important to get out ahead of a crisis or storm before it takes on
biblical proportions. Because BP failed to do so, it will be studied in business and
law schools as a model of ineffective corporate crisis management for many
years.
In 2007, BP brought in a new CEO, Tony Hayward, to reverse the
corporation's tarnished image after a major oil refinery explosion in Texas in
2005 and a pipeline leak in Alaska in 2006.29 In April 2010, perched in his
London office, Tony Hayward posed the following question to BP executives:
"What the hell did we do to deserve this?"o Hayward posited that
"[r]eputationally, and in every other way, we will be judged by the quality,
intensity, speed and efficacy of our response."' Hayward was right.
BP's reputation will remain tattered and the corporation will take a major
financial hit for years to come. "But regardless of the out-of-pocket costs, the
long-term damage to BP's reputation-and possibly, its future prospects for
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico-is likely to be far higher, according to industry
analysts." BP spent millions of dollars per day to clean up the oil spill. Early on,
it was estimated that BP was spending "$6 million a day on fixing the
mess. . . ."3 Nonetheless, and "[r]egardless of the final assessment of blame,
Wall Street analysts [warn] that everything BP does from now on will come
under increased scrutiny by regulators and that potential partners in drilling
ventures may well look elsewhere."34
29. See Clifford Krauss, Oil Spill's Blow to BP's Image May Eclipse Out-of-Pocket Costs, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2010, at B I; see also, Alan Cowell, BP's Chief Quits Over Revelations About Private Life, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 2007, at Cl; Jad Mouawad, For New Chief BP's Problems Range from Rusted Pipes to a
Tarnished Image, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2007, at C3.
30. See Krauss, supra note 29.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Financially, we can look at how BP was performing in times of comfort, as
compared to times of challenge, crisis, and adversity. Through April 2010, BP
remained in a comfortable position as its stock was trading around $60 per share
on the New York Stock Exchange." However, as the crisis and challenge of the
Gulf oil spill set in by the end of June 2010, BP shares had dropped as low as
$26.75 per share, resulting in a more than fifty percent price drop per share.
Figure 1, below, illustrates the 52-week price range of BP shares from October
13, 2009 to October 13, 2010.
BP p.I.. Common stock
Nov9 n10 Marla MaIy10 Julln 5p0
6000
liii ~ 155
Fig. 1. 52-Week Price Range for BP
375
(October 13, 2009 through October 13, 2010)37
Clearly, in times of comfort Wall Street investors viewed BP as a sound
investment. However, as turbulence and crisis set in, investors fled the market
and sold their BP shares in droves. For Wall Street investors, BP was not
managing the Gulf of Mexico oil spill crisis to their liking. This is evident from
the volume spike in the months of June and July 2010, as indicated in Figure 1.38
The public, policymakers, and investors assess how corporations manage crisis,
and they keep scorecards. If a corporation is evaluated poorly by the public, the
public may boycott that corporation and refuse to buy its products or services,
thereby hurting its bottom-line. Policymakers may scrutinize a corporation more
35. See BP Common Stock Chart, infra note 37.
36. Id.
37. Yahoo Finance, BP p.l.c. Common Stock: Basic Chart, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/bc?s=BP&t=ly
(last visited October 14, 2010) [hereinafter BP Common Stock Chart] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
38. Id.
814
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 42
closely in crisis, and investors will flee in numbers if it appears that the
corporation is poorly managing a crisis. As Jawaharlal Nehru explained: "Every
little thing counts in a crisis." 39
In the case of BP's reaction to the Gulf oil spill, Lesson Two is apparent: the
true and ultimate measure of a corporation (and a person) is not how it stands in
times of comfort, but how it stands and deals with adversity, challenge,
controversy, and crisis. On this account, in BP's worst moment of crisis as a
corporation, management failed to act confidently, decisively, and swiftly. I am a
firm believer that you can learn one of two things from the people you encounter
in life: either what to do or what not to do. Corporations, which are managed and
directed by people, can also learn from each other. Wise corporations observing
BP's actions will take away lessons and use them when they are confronted by
crisis. Undoubtedly, corporations have a great deal to learn from BP. One lesson
in particular that corporate leaders should take from BP's actions is summed up
in the following maxim: Crisis will come-in times of comfort, prepare for crisis.
IV. LESSON THREE: THE EMPEROR OR KING MAY BE TOPPLED
A king is one who has "few things to desire and many things to fear."
-Francis Bacon"
The modem king has become a vermiform appendix: useless when quiet;
when obtrusive, in danger of removal.
-Austin O'Malley4 1
As CEO of BP, Tony Hayward made a number of gaffes in managing the
Gulf of Mexico oil spill that ultimately led to his ouster and demise. For starters,
on a couple of occasions, Hayward made public statements and comments that
were awkward at best and insensitive at worst. In addition to these public
statements and comments, Hayward engaged in personal activities that appeared
inappropriate for a CEO managing a crisis, arguably threatening the very
existence and viability of his corporation. For example, while oil was gushing out
of control in the Gulf of Mexico, Hayward was caught on camera off the coast of
England watching his yacht compete in one of the world's largest races.42 While
the American public wanted to see a CEO with his sleeves rolled up in the
trenches trying to solve one of the nation's biggest problems, the American
public saw a rich CEO watching his yacht race.
39. Quotationsbook.com, Quotes by Jawaharlal Nehru, supra note 27.
40. Quotationsbook.com, Quotes by Francis Bacon, http://quotationsbook.com/quote/14694/
#axzzlGRb80Rn4 (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
41. Just-Quotes.com, King Quotes & Sayings: Austin O'Malley, http://www.just-quotes.com/king-
quotes.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
42. Liz Robbins, Embattled BP Chief Takes In Yacht Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, at A20.
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On one fateful day during the Gulf of Mexico oil spill crisis, Hayward made
a statement he probably now regrets. In the midst of the BP oil spill, Hayward
famously stated: "I'd like my life back." 3 Rahm Emanuel, White House Chief of
Staff, observed that this statement was "part of a long line of P.R. gaffes and
mistakes."" Most would agree that as BP's visible public representative,
Hayward botched and mismanaged its response to the oil spill. 45 This was most
evident in his incoherent and evasive responses to questions posed to him by
members of Congress. "During his testimony, which stretched over seven hours,
Mr. Hayward repeatedly said he was not responsible for the decisions that may
have led to the accident and could not comment on its causes."4
Hayward received "lackluster reviews in the United States and Britain for his
House performance."4 Even if it is possible to forgive Hayward for his response
to the crisis, which it is not, Hayward's public comments, perhaps more than
anything else, ultimately sealed his ultimate doom. In essence, Hayward signed
his own death warrant when he publicly stated: "I'd like my life back." From that
moment forward, Hayward was a dead man walking-marching off to his own
execution and saying a prayer for forgiveness. When Hayward testified before
48Congress, he further dug his own grave.
Over the last decade, thoughtful legal scholars and commentators have spent
a great deal of time thinking about and exploring the dominance of the CEO in
corporate law and governance. 49 The ever-dominant CEO can now be dubbed the
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Christopher Hughes & Antony Currie, A Slip Too Many for BP's Chief, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2010, at B2; Jad Mouawad & Clifford Krauss, Another Torrent BP Works to Stem: Its C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES, June
4, 2010, at Al.
46. Clifford Krauss, BP Moves Chief Executive to Lesser Role in Spill Response, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2010, at All.
47. Id.
48. Editorial, A Bad Day for BP and Mr. Barton, N. Y. Times, June 18, 2010, at A28.
49. See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEx. L. REV. 987 (2010); Paul S.
Miller, Congress, Corporate Boards, and Oversight: A Public Law/Private Law Comparison, 44 U. RICH. L.
REV. 771 (2010); Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance, 61
S.C. L. REV. 171 (2009); Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO
Autonomy, 54 ST. LOUis U. L.J. 1 (2009); Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate
Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929 (2008); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez, & Benjamin Oklan, The
Convergance of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 559 (2008); Lawrence Lederman, Disney
Examined: A Case Study in Corporate Governance and CEO Succession, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 557 (2008);
Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard
and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211 (2006); Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind,
and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1131 (2006);
Recent Cases, Corporate Law-Fiduciary Duties of Directors-Delaware Court of Chancery Finds Disney
Directors Not Liable for Approval of an Employment Agreement Providing $140 Million in Termination
Payments-In Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative litigation, No. CIV. A. 15452, 2005 Wl 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,
2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 923 (2006); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix In Sight, 31 J.
CORP. L. 39 (2005); Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS.
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"imperial CEO." Nonetheless, some commentators suggest that the pendulum
has begun to shift from the dominant "imperial CEO" back to a level of
dominance for shareholders. In fact, some legal scholars and commentators now
speak about the "imperial shareholder."o Perhaps, there is a lesson to be gleaned
from Tony Hayward's dismissal from BP.
History can teach us many lessons. As the age-old adage goes, those who
don't learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Modern corporate America can
learn many lessons from ancient history. Harkening back to ancient Rome, the
emperor reigned supreme. In modem corporate America, the CEO often reigns
supreme within the corporate realm. Throughout the last decade, characters like
Jeffrey Skilling (Enron), John Rigas (Adelphia), Dennis Kaslowski (Tyco),
Bernard Ebbers (WorldCom), and a host of others, reigned supreme at their
corporations-much like Roman emperors-just prior to their precipitous fall
from grace. The Roman historian Tacitus highlights one brutal fact of being
emperor: if one becomes a tyrant or is perceived to be one, or if one offends the
sensibilities of elites or the general public, people in that power circle will plot
the emperor's demise and topple him or her from his or her position. In ancient
Rome, emperors like Caesar, Tiberius,5' Caligula,52 and Nero were literally
killed for their direct or perceived indiscretions. Hopefully, in modern America,
the public is not so extreme as to ask for the CEO's blood.
A lesson that can be taken away from Tony Hayward's toppling at BP is that
the CEO is perhaps no longer such a deified emperor, but rather just a human
who can be pushed aside when people (especially enough people or influential
people) start calling for his or her head. In modern and even in corporate
America, no person's position is certain. If a corporate figure makes what people
perceive to be an unforgiveable mistake or misstep, forces will gather to topple
and oust that person, even if he or she sits at the top of the organizational chart.
In relation to corporate governance and scholarship, there is a huge and
fundamental question that forces the public to reevaluate its thinking as it has
developed and crystallized in recent years: have the days of the "imperial CEO"
truly passed?
L. REV. 773 (2004); and Jane Elizabeth Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk: The Changing
Face of Corporate Governance, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 43 (1998).
50. See generally John F. Olson, Is the Sky Really Falling? Shareholder-Centric Versus Director-
Centric Corporate Governance, 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 295 (2008); Jay Razzouk, The Momentum,
Motive, and Mouse-Kapades of the Majority Vote Movement, 1 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 391 (2008);
Carl C. Icahn, North Dakota's Pro-Shareholder Law: A Major Advancement, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1039 (2008).
51. Tacitus describes Tiberius' murder when he writes: "Marco, unperturbed, ordered the old man to be
smothered with a heap of bed-clothes and left alone." TACITUS, THE ANNALS OF IMPERIAL ROME 226 (1989).
52. Unfortunately, Tacitus' description of Emperor Caligula's depraved and unbalanced four-year reign
from 37-41 A.D., which ended in his death, has been lost. Id. at 231.
53. Again, unfortunately, Tacitus' full description of Nero's death has been lost. We are lead to believe
that Nero perhaps took his own life guided by a former slave named Epaphroditus. Id. at 397.
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The demise of Tony Hayward forces one to pause and question the
imperialism of the CEO's throne within the corporation. The modem American
CEO should have much to fear. At the end of the day, the "imperial CEO" must
question the myth and reality surrounding his or her position and very existence
within the corporation. Again, the take-away corporate law and life lesson is that
no one should grow complacent in any life endeavor because the threat of
removal is a constant danger lurking beneath the surface. In modem America,
corporate or otherwise, one need not be an emperor to lose his or her stature and
status. Tony Hayward likely thinks about this lesson at night.
V. LESSON FOUR: REGULATORS AND THE REGULATED MAKE FOR
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS-SOCIETY MUST VIGILANTLY GUARD
AGAINST REGULATORY CAPTURE
The Commission ... is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It
satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of the
railroads, at the same time that that supervision is almost entirely
nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more
inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of
things.. . . The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to
utilize it.
-U.S. Attorney General, Richard Olney,
opining upon the Interstate Commerce
Commission
5 4
If the government is to tell big business men how to run their business,
then don't you see that big business men have to get closer to the
government even than they are now? Don't you see that they must
capture the government, in order not to be restrained too much by it?
Must capture the government? They have already captured it.
-President Woodrow Wilson"
"Three years ago, the national laboratory then headed by Steven Chu
received the bulk of a $500 million grant from the British oil giant BP to develop
alternative energy sources through a new Energy Biosciences Institute." 6 Dr.
Steven Chu, President Obama's current Secretary of Energy, received the grant
from BP's chief scientist at the time, Dr. Steven E. Koonin, "a fellow theoretical
54. Thomas Frank, Editorial, Obama and 'Regulatory Capture', WALL ST. J., June 24, 2009, at A13.
55. Wikisource.com, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People,
http://en.wikisource.org/wikifTheNewFreedom:_A_Call_for_the_Emancipationof the_GenerousEnergies of a
People (last visited October 13, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
56. Helene Cooper & John M. Broder, BP's Ties to Agency Are Long and Complex, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2010, at A14.
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physicist whom Dr. Chu jocularly described as 'my twin brother.""' In fact, Dr.
Koonin followed his "twin brother" to Washington, and now serves as the Under
Secretary of Energy for Science." "The relationships between Dr. Chu, Dr.
Koonin, and BP illustrate the complexity of ties between the company and the
government now playing out along the Gulf Coast as [we] struggle to cope with
one of the nation's worst environmental disasters." 9 Government and business
sometimes develop "symbiotic business, technical and political
interdependencies"" and relationships. Pentagon and military contractors, for
example, have developed such a relationship.6 In connection with the BP oil
spill, a relationship has also arisen between the government and big oil interests.62
In this instance, "while there is no evidence that Dr. Chu or Dr. Koonin have
represented BP's viewpoints in internal deliberations or sought to influence
administration policy in a way that would benefit BP, the mere fact of their
shared history brought expressions of concern from environmentalists and other
critics of the White House's response to the spill."6 "The fact that Steven Chu
selected Steve Koonin, BP's chief scientist, to be his under secretary could
predispose them to think that they could maybe negotiate with BP, could be more
like partners regarding the oil cleanup."" "It makes it more likely for [Drs. Chu
and Koonin] to see BP as a legitimate partner in handling the cleanup
operation." In response to the oil spill, "what people are questioning, with good
reason, is whether the government has been too soft on BP."" "This whole thing
just underscores that corporate interests have created, over time, these
relationships that give them unfair access to policy makers." President Obama
himself has noted the "often cozy relationship between government regulators
and oil companies."6 Although the Department of the Interior had jurisdiction
over the BP oil spill,69 Secretary of Energy Dr. Chu was brought in as a sort of
consultant "to continue engagement on strategies to stop the oil spill.,,70
The Minerals Management Service ("MMS"), within the Department of the
Interior, is in charge of regulating and collecting royalties from the oil industry.7 1
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Eric Lipton & John M. Broder, Regulators' Warnings Weren't Acted On, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010,
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More than a decade ago, and again in 2004 and 2009, the MMS warned offshore
oil rig operators that they needed to install backup systems to control underwater
valves, known as blowout preventers, which are used to cut the flow of oil from a
wellhead in case of emergency.2 The MMS "never took steps to address the issue
comprehensively, relying instead on industry assurances that it was on top of the
problem ... .,." "Agency records show that from 2001 to 2007, there were 1,443
serious drilling accidents in offshore operations, leading to 41 deaths, 302
injuries and 356 oil spills."7 4 Despite this horrible track record, MMS "continues
to allow the industry largely to police itself, saying that the best technical experts
work for industry, not for the government.". "Critics say that, then and now, the
minerals service has been crippled by this dependence on industry and by a
climate of regulatory indulgence."
Politicians have taken note of this regulatory and industry indulgence. For
example, Florida Senator Bill Nelson, a Democrat, noted: "Everything that's
done by the oil industry is done for profit. . . . Throw in the fact that regulators
have taken a lax attitude toward overseeing their operations, and you have a
recipe for catastrophe."" Representative Darrell Issa of California, the senior
Republican on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, further
observed that "[tihere is a bureaucracy and dysfunctional culture that has to be
held accountable.", 8
In 2009, BP "teamed with other offshore operators to oppose a proposed rule
that would have required stricter safety and environmental standards and more
frequent inspections."" BP insisted that "'extensive, prescriptive' regulations
were not needed for offshore drilling, and urged the [MMS] to allow operators to
define the steps they would take to ensure safety largely on their own."so
"Numerous Congressional and internal investigations have called the [MMS]
badly mismanaged and at times corrupt. It has been rocked by regular scandals,
including disclosures in 2008 that agency officials took bribes and engaged in
drug use and sex with oil industry officials."" As if these allegations were not
enough, MMS's "own scientists have said that senior agency officials in recent
years revised staff reports to eliminate environmental concerns that might have
at Al2.
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complicated oil-company drilling applications for offshore sites in waters near
Alaska."8 2
Leading up to the BP oil spill, MMS was at best inept and at worst a corrupt
agency. Around the world, other governments have been keen on limiting
ineptitude among their oil industry watchdogs. "Elsewhere around the world, the
trend has been to split up agencies like the [MMS], separating the officials ...
responsible for overseeing natural resource extraction from those who are
charged with ensuring . . . safety.". "For example, in 2005, Australia followed
Britain's lead and created a separate regulator, the National Offshore Petroleum
Safety Authority, which severed these functions after a 1988 oil rig explosion in
the North Sea, known as the Piper Alpha accident, that killed 167 people.""
David Doig, the British chief executive of an industry-owned nonprofit
organization, the Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organization, observed:
"You need to divorce operations monitoring from the integrity monitoring,
because operations will always be the one driving behavior. . . . They're
motivated by the need to keep things going, and the finances rolling."
The entanglement between the oil industry and government begs just one
major question in connection with the BP oil spill and this exploration of the
MMS: was regulatory capture partially to blame for the BP oil spill? Regulatory
capture occurs when private firms and interest groups, acting in their own private
interests, come to dominate, over time, the regulatory agencies responsible for
regulating their industries. In essence, the gamekeeper turns poacher, or at least
aids and facilitates the poacher."
One thing is certain, regulators and the regulated make for strange
bedfellows. Nothing good ever comes from this union. Modern society must be
ever vigilant to guard against the symbiotic marriage between regulators and the
regulated. Looking at the BP oil spill in hindsight, it is clear that regulatory
capture played some role in the tragedy that occurred. The MMS did a terrible
job of enforcing the safety concerns that the agency itself raised with the oil
industry. The entanglement between BP and the government at other levels is
troubling and merits further exploration, leading us to the fourth lesson to be
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Gamekeeper turns poacher or, at least, helps poacher. The theory of regulatory capture was set out
by Richard Posner, an economist and lawyer at the University of Chicago, who argued that
REGULATION is not about the public interest at all, but is a process, by which interest groups seek
to promote their private interest . . . . Over time, regulatory agencies come to be dominated by the
industries regulated." Most economists are less extreme, arguing that regulation often does good but
is always at RISK of being captured by the regulated firms.
Id.
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learned from the BP oil spill-society must acknowledge regulatory capture and
guard against it. If not, private interests might very well end up trumping and
damaging the public's interest to disastrous effect, as witnessed with the BP oil
spill.
VI. LESSON FIVE: YOUR BIG BROTHER OR BIG SISTER CAN AND WILL TWIST
YOUR ARM WHEN HE OR SHE HAS A CHANCE
I think it is a tragedy of the first proportion that a private corporation
can be subjected to what I would characterize as a shakedown-in this
case, a $20 billion shakedown.
-Rep. Joe L. Barton, Texas (R)"
BP should bear the full financial responsibility for the accident.
-Rep. Joe L. Barton, Texas (R)' 9
Your Big Brother or Big Sister can and will twist your arm when he or she
has a chance. Growing up as the youngest of five children in Cleveland, Ohio, I
think I am in a unique position to testify to this fact. Especially when my parents
were not present, my brother and three sisters had an uncanny ability to latch
onto my arm and twist it to remind me that I needed to behave and conduct
myself in a more dignified manner. When they (my older brother and three
sisters) did so, I immediately came to attention and stopped behaving badly. Arm
twisting by my "Big Brother" and "Big Sisters" contributed to the man that I am
today. In a metaphorical sense, the federal government's Chief Executive
Officer, President Barack Obama, took the shape of Big Brother or Big Sister in
the case of BP. President Obama used the bully pulpit" that the Presidency
affords to exact monetary discipline and order on BP. Political power can be a
useful tool in situations like these-the President can and will sometimes twist a
few arms. Personally, I would not go as far as Representative Joe Barton in
characterizing President Obama's actions as a "shakedown." 9' I would definitely
call it an arm-twisting, and a painful one at that.
In June 2010, after President Obama summoned BP's top leaders to the
White House, BP announced that it would create a $20 billion escrow fund to pay
damage claims in the Gulf of Mexico. Separately, BP "voluntarily" agreed to
88. Fighting Words, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, at WK2.
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90. See Merriam-Webster.com, Definition of Bully Pulpit, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
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establish a $100 million fund to compensate oil rig workers left jobless by the
Obama Administration's deep-water drilling moratorium.3 The BP Recovery
Fund is administered by Kenneth R. Feinberg, the former administrator of the
9/11 Victims Fund. 4 It took four intense days of negotiations for BP and the
White House to establish the Recovery Fund.5 "Under the famous portrait of a
charging Theodore Roosevelt on horseback, administration and company
officials haggled over the last details in an extraordinary White House meeting
that went more than four hours, double the time scheduled, and was punctuated
by breaks as each side huddled separately."96 Finally, President Obama "sealed
the deal in a private, 25-minute session with BP's chairman, Carl-Henric
Svanberg."'
The BP Recovery Fund "will be created over four years, at $5 billion a
year.". "It is backed by the collateral of $20 billion in company assets in the
United States."" BP indicated that it intended to "raise money by reducing
spending programs and selling $10 billion in assets . . . ."'" In 2009, BP
generated $17 billion in profits.' One should not forget that in the midst of this
crisis, BP faced ire and outrage over its intended plan to pay $10.5 billion in
dividends to shareholders.o2 "The escrow agreement was hailed in Congress....
Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, typically one of Mr. Obama's
most vocal critics, called it a 'step in the right direction."" 0 As would soon
become apparent, not all members of Congress appreciated President Obama's
efforts to establish the BP Recovery Fund.'" Some, particularly Rep. Joe Barton,
Republican from Texas, vocally described President Obama's actions as a
"shakedown."'o
Shakedown or arm-twisting, President Obama used his political capital to
exert pressure on BP to bring about a just and equitable result in compensating
residents of the Gulf region. Undoubtedly, President Obama used his bully pulpit
to figuratively twist BP's arm to force the company to do the right thing.
President Obama's actions as a representative of the federal government
exhibited that the government-taking the form and shape of Big Brother or Big
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Sister-can and will occasionally twist arms and force corporate actors to act
responsibly and with a social consciousness where necessary. Again, we are
reminded that political leaders have a great deal of power and authority to shape
and mold corporate behavior to benefit the public good, and to advance collective
goals and objectives-preservation of the environment certainly benefits us all.
President Obama's actions and negotiations with BP remind us of this fact. The
takeaway lesson we can learn from the BP oil spill is that Big Brother or Big
Sister-in the manifestation of government-can and will twist your arm when
you get out of line just like my older siblings did when I was growing up. BP
learned this lesson all too well in 2010.
VII. CONCLUSION
As a corporate law professor, I spend a great deal of my time studying and
learning about the modern corporation and its role and place in American society.
There are times when corporate law and governance intersect with life. I love and
savor these moments. As this Article has demonstrated, from the 2010 BP oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico we have many lessons to learn and apply to our own
lives. Yes, we can and do learn from the actions of corporations and their actors
(directors, officers, and agents). From the BP oil spill I gleaned five (5) basic
lessons. Allow me a moment to summarize and recap these lessons or maxims.
First, if you lie, or are perceived to be lying, or make an inaccurate statement
people will lose trust in you. Second, we are not judged based on how we act in
times of comfort, but based on how we react in times of crisis. Third, the
Emperor or King may be toppled. Fourth, regulators and the regulated make for
strange bedfellows-we must vigilantly guard against regulatory capture. Fifth,
and finally, your Big Brother or Big Sister can and will twist your arm when he
or she has a chance. Hopefully, these and other lessons you have gleaned from
the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico will connect and resonate in your
personal lives, and how you perceive and intellectually think about the role of
corporations in our modem society.
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